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Defendant was charged with murder and filed application for a
suspended sentence. The trial court in its charge, submitted to the jury the
issue of suspension of the sentence in the event they found defendant guilty.
The jury found the defendant guilty and the defendant sought a new trial
on the ground of jury misconduct which motion he attempted to support by
the affidavit of one of the jurors showing that the jury discussed provisions
of the Adult Probation Law and an erroneous statement was made by one
of the jurors that the judge could place the defendant on probation if he
saw fit. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, one justice dissenting, held
that as a result of the foregoing the defendant did not receive such a fair and
impartial trial as would allow the judgment of conviction to stand. New trial
granted. Fariasv. State, Tex. Crim. App., 322 S.W.2d 281 (1959).
VERDICTS.-

Early in the English common law the courts freely admitted juror affidavits
to show misbehavior or partiality in arriving at their verdicts.1 It was not
until 1785, in the case of Vaise against Delaval,2 that the rule was established
(through Chief Judge Mansfield) which, plainly stated, will not allow
affidavits by jurors to impeach their verdicts. This has become the general
rule and the courts of the United States have tenaciously applied it, though
sometimes differing as to reason, 3 since its inception. The rule has been
4
criticized and modified on occasion, 5 but, in general, remains for the most
part unchanged. The chief qualification of the rule seems to be that affidavits
are not receivable when they would tend to show matters which essentially

willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful
oi negligent, are against the policy of the law."
N.D. Rev. Code § 8-0707 (1943) "A common carrier cannot be exonerated from
liability for the negligence, fraud, or other wrongful act of himself or. his servants by
any agreement made in anticipation thereof.";
N.D. Rev. Code § 8-0706 (1943) "The obligation of a common carrier cannot be
limited by general notice on his part but may be limited by special contract."
1. Norman v. Beamont, Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. 1281 (C.P. 1744); Dent v. Hertford, 2 Salk 645, 91 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B. 1696).
2. 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
3. Taylor v. State, 18 Ala. App. 466, 93 So. 78 (1922) (deliberations of jury must be
kept secret because of public policy reasons); Saltzman v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 125 Cal. 501, 58 Pac. 169 (1899) (court gave two reasons for the rule: "(1) that
the jurors, who are practically the only witnesses in regard to the matter, may not be
tampered with and verdicts by these means imperiled; and (2) to secure independence
and freedom from improper restraint on the part of the jury"); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.
J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) (the working of the mind of a juror is a personal thing
and cannot be subjected to the test of other testimony, so such testimony should not be
received to overthrow the verdict to which all assented), see Comment, 31 Notre Dame
Law. 484 (1956) "...
[W]hile other reasons sometimes support the exclusion of jurors'
affidavits, the rule itself exists as a rule because of a desire of the courts to protect the
jury system from what it deems an evil which will destroy its purpose and value."
4. Crawford v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 54 (1821); see McDonald v. Press, 238
U.S. 264 (1915), wherein the court calls the rule of exclusion a matter of choosing the
lesser of two evils.
5. Wright v. The Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866);
United States v. Dressier, 112 F.2d 972 (1940) (dictum).
6. Wright v. The Illinois Mississippi Telegraph Co. supra note 5. Some examples of
matters which are said to inhere in the verdict and are therefore inadmissible are: that
jurors concurred in the gu ilty verdict due to a mistaken belief as to maximum penalty
to be imposed, Boyles v. People, 90 Colo. 32, 6 P.2d 7, 10 (1931); that the jury considered things which the court had instructed them not to consider, State v. Jester, 46 Idaho
561. 270 P. 417 (1928); that the jury misunderstood the instructions of the court, State
v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 32 N.W.2d 398 (1948); that the jury did not understand the
meaning of their verdict, State v. Kagi, 105 Kan. 536, 185 P. 62 (1919).

1960]

RECENT CASES

inhere in the verdict itself.0 Conversely, affidavits are receivable when they
contain matters which do not inhere in the verdict7
In the instant case the affidavit was allowed to come in and as a result a
new trial was granted because the statement made by a juror during deliberation was, to use the court's words, " . . . clearly a misstatement of law." This
case seems to reject, without mention, an earlier Texas decision wherein the
court held that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial even though
there was evidence of similar misconduct on the part of the jury. 8 These two
cases tend to indicate a Texas withdrawal from rigid adherence to the general
rule. As a matter of fact, the court in the instant case ruled that an affidavit
was admissible to show a misstatement of law during deliberation. This was
directly contrary to the general rule.0 Admitting an affidavit in such a
situation is a clear case of allowing into evidence matters which inhere in
the verdict.'0
North Dakota aligns itself with the majority and will not allow a juror
affidavit to impeach a verdict." Provision for the use of such an affidavit is
to be found in the Code, but then only where the verdict is determined by
chance. 1 - The statute is intended for use in civil cases and the North Dakota
courts have not yet determined its applicability in criminal cases. 13
To conclude, it would seem that the decision in the instant case, though
out of line with the general rule, insured the defendant a fair and impartial
trial. Courts faced with possible application of the exclusion rule in the future
would do well to bear this in mind.
DAVID ORSER

JURY - WAIVER OF RIGHT - IN CRIMINAL CASES. - Defendant was convicted of making or causing to be made certain material false statements on
behalf of a corporation to the state Commissioner of Securities for registration
as a dealer. The district court denied the motion for a new trial and defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Defendant alleged inter
alia, that the district court erred in refusing to try the case without a jury
when the defendant and the states attorney had waived a jury in open court
pursuant to the terms of a statute.1 The court, one justice dissenting, held

7. State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) "Where

(the) jurors' testimony

goes. . .merely to the existence of conditions or the occurence of events hearing on the
verdict, that basis of policy does not exist, and this whether the condition happens or
the event occurs in or outside of the jury room."; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1876)
Overt acts, that is, things which are open to the knowledge of all the jury, and not
simply within the personal conciousness of one, are admissible.
8. Salcido v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 319 S.W.2d 329 (1959).
9. See note 3 supra.
10 Ruffalo v. State, 196 Wis. 446, 220 N.W. 190 (1928) (defendants attempted use
o, juror affidavits to show that he was convicted due to erroneous jury belief that a guilty
verdict would result in leniency being shown toward him was excluded); Trimble v.
State, 118 Neb. 267, 224 N.W. 274 (1929) (an affidavit stating that jury disregarded
instructions and evidence would not be allowed) (dictum).
11. State v. Graber, 77 N.D. 645, 44 N.W.2d 798 (1950); State v. Forrester, 14 N.D.
335, 103 N.W. 625 (1905). "
12. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-1902, (2) (1943).
13. State v. Graber, 77 N.D. 665, 44 N.W.2d 798 (1950) (dictum).
1. N.D. ]Rev. Code §29-1602 (1943) "In any case, whether a midemeanor or felony, a
trial jury may be waived by the consent of the defendant and the state's, attorney expressed
in open court and entered on the minutes of the court. Otherwise, 'the issues of fact
must be tried by the jury."

